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Abstract 
The present article explores meanings of EUrope as they emerged in individual 
interviews and focus-groups organized around the question of European attachment. 
The article shows that the ways people make sense of EUrope can be divided into 
three major categories: cultural-national, cultural-transnational, and functional-
utilitarian. Cultural-national referents describe EUrope through the prism of the 
nation-state and reproduce the isomorphism between territory and identity which has 
characterized, at least in theory, the nation-state itself. Cultural-transnational referents 
present EUrope as a normative model for the rest of the world, a model for ‘another’ 
globalization, more social and less liberalist, and a champion of humanitarianism and 
international peace. Functional-utilitarian referents address EUrope as a space which 
could help the individual and/or the collectivity to which the individual belongs to 
enhance their well-being. In this latter case, EUrope resonates with a post-national 
space, one which goes beyond the isomorphism between territory and identity. The 
article argues that the reasons why people might identify with and support EUrope are 
different, and not always driven by feelings of emotional attachment. As such, the 
article brings empirical evidence to the thesis that a EUropean demos, understood as a 
sense of collective identity, should not be considered as a necessary condition for the 
existence of a EUropean polity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1991, Eurobarometer surveys have periodically asked people living in the 
European Union to indicate their degree of territorial attachment to the town/village 
where they live, their region, their nation and Europe. Contrary to local, regional and 
national attachment, European attachment has clearly shown, across the years, an 
unstable trend. This article aims to analyze people’s narratives activated by the 
question about their European attachment in order to explore meanings of Europe. It 
should be said that the notion of ‘territorial attachment’, besides being under-
theorized, is also an ambiguous one. Some authors have equated attachment with 
belonging (Pollini, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2006), which, in turn, has been regarded as a 
synonym of collective identity (Weeks, 1990; Croucher, 2004; Weedon, 2004; 
Buonfino and Thomson, 2007). The aim of the present article is to use both 
quantitative and qualitative data to map the ways in which people make sense of their 
attachment to Europe rather than shedding new light on the notion of territorial 
attachment per se. Given the emphasis on people’s narratives, this article clearly 
belongs to what Bruter (2005: 5) defines as a ‘bottom-up’ approach - as opposed to a 
‘top-down’ one, which engages Europe as an institutional object. 
From a quantitative perspective, scholars have mainly focused on the notion of 
European support rather than attachment and have highlighted five major explanatory 
theories: cognitive mobilization, political values, utilitarianism, class partisanship, and 
support for government (Gabel, 1998). In his classic work, Ronald Inglehart (1977) 
posited that, given the highly abstract level of the notion of Europe and its post-
national, egalitarian reformism, a person with well-developed cognitive skills and 
post-materialist values would be more likely to support European integration than a 
person with low cognitive skills and materialist values. More recently, however, 
Gabel (1998) has shown that there is little statistical support for cognitive 
mobilization and political values and has instead stressed the relevance of a utilitarian 
dimension (see also Kritzinger, 2005). 
Qualitative studies about European identity can be categorized into two major 
groups. On the one hand, there are authors who adopt what I call a ‘national’ 
perspective, which equates the process of European identity formation with the 
process undergone by the nation-state. This perspective maintains - either in 
primordial or constructivist terms – that a European identity must exist for a European 
polity to be viable and that this identity should resemble a national identity, i.e. an 
identity based on a commonality of language, traditions, history, myths, etc. Typical 
examples of this perspective are, among others, the works of Anthony D. Smith 
(1992) and Michael Mann (1998). In their views, European and national identities are 
‘competing identities’, as Europe itself is perceived as an impending nation-state.  
On the other hand, scholars have essayed to take a different view on Europe and 
European identity – a view, in the words of Alexander Murphy (1999: 54), “less 
wedded to the ideas about territory and identity that developed along with the modern 
state system” (see also Painter, 2001; Delanty, 2003; and Rumford, 2003). Jürgen 
Habermas (1992, 2001) best exemplifies this attempt to go beyond the national 
perspective. According to Habermas, Europe might indeed stand for a post-national 
polity, one which breaks the traditional isomorphism between the cultural (identity) 
and the political (territorial state), which has historically characterized, at least in 
theory,  the nation-state (Appadurai, 1996; Hedetoft and Hjort, 2000). To be sure, this 
isomorphism does not refer to the coming together of two distinct categories, as 
national identity and the territorial state have been tied, at least during the last two 
centuries, into a mutually constitutive relationship. Yet, what the post-national 
literature wants to signal is that, in the present age of increased internationalization of 
markets, financial and communication flows, international mobility of people, etc., 
this historical relationship has become problematic. That is why, for instance, Beck 
and Grande (2007: 69) posit that “Europe should not (and could not) become both a 
nation and a state”. 
In the present article, evidence of utilitarian, ‘national’ and ‘post-national’ 
perspectives emerges from the answers of the respondents, pointing to the fact that in 
people’s views the existence of a European polity cannot be pinned down to a single 
rationale. The article is divided into three sections. In the first one, I offer a brief 
statistical description of the trend associated with European attachment, which 
supports the case of the uniqueness of this type of attachment in relation to the other 
three forms of territorial attachment (local, regional, and national). In the second 
section I discuss the process of data collection and analysis and in third section I 
explore the meanings associated with European attachment, distinguishing between 
‘cultural’ (national and transnational) and ‘functional-utilitarian’ meanings. In the 
concluding section, I summarize the findings into a theoretical scheme which aims to 
visually capture the discursive forms through which people make sense of Europe. 
 
 
II. EUROPEAN ATTACHMENT: A BRIEF STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION 
 
In this section, I analyze territorial attachment drawing on the Eurobarometer 
survey series. Eurobarometer (Eb) is a consortium of survey firms which, since the 
early 1970s, has run periodical surveys on various topics on behalf of the European 
Union. Eurobarometer surveys cover the population of the member countries of the 
European Union, aged 15 years and over. For each member state, the sample 
population used in Eurobarometer surveys is 1,000 people, however, in some cases 
this number varies slightly above or below 1,000. The sample populations of Northern 
Ireland and Luxembourg are respectively equal to about 300 and 600 people. Given 
the socio-economic and political differences between East Germany and West 
Germany and between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, these territories are treated 
as separate in Eurobarometer. 
As stated above, since 1991 Eurobarometer surveys have periodically asked 
people living in the European Union to indicate their degree of territorial attachment 
to the town/village where they live, their region, their nation and Europe. Compared 
to the attachment to the first three territories, attachment to Europe has traditionally 
scored very poorly. The average value measured across the EU-15 countries during 
the survey period 1991-2005 shows that 28 percentage points separate European 
attachment (61%) from local and regional attachments (both at 89%), which in turn 
are only three percentage points away from national attachment (92%) (see Table 1). 
_______________________________ 
 
INSERT TAB. 1 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
The distribution of the values across the scale (‘very attached’, ‘fairly attached’, 
‘not very attached’, ‘not at all attached’) indicates that European attachment is the 
only one with a relatively normal distribution, i.e. the majority of the answers of the 
respondents localize in the middle (‘fairly’, ‘not very’). This obviously suggests that 
European attachment does not generate the same intensity or emotional involvement 
as in the other three forms of territorial attachment (see Fig. 1). 
_______________________________ 
INSERT FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
The uniqueness of European attachment also emerges when we observe its 
temporal trend. Overall, European attachment has increased significantly across the 
years (18 percentage points, from 47% in 1991 to 65% in 2005), while local 
attachment has only increased by one percentage point (from 86% to 87%), national 
attachment has remained stable (90%), and regional attachment has experienced a 
small decrease (from 91% to 88%) – small variations which are understandable given 
the already high original values. However, more importantly, the increase in European 
attachment shows a clear unstable trend (see Fig. 2). 
_______________________________ 
 
INSERT FIG. 2 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
In terms of absolute value, distribution among the four-value scale and stability 
over time, European attachment clearly differs from local, regional and national 
attachments. Simply put, relatively few people feel attached to Europe and even those 
who declare to have such a sentiment express it in a rather moderate and unstable 
way. If ‘attachment’ is used as a proxy for ‘identity’ – a choice legitimated by the 
interchangeable use of these two terms made by both scholars (see introduction) and 
the respondents of the present study (see below) – it clearly emerges that Europe is 
not as strong a source of identification as the locale, the region or the nation. This 
does not simply suggest what is already known (i.e. the weakness of the sentiment of 
European identity), but also that ‘European’ perhaps cannot be associated with any 
form of identity at all. This is an argument which can be grounded on the main tenets 
of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). According to Tajfel, 
social identity is defined on the basis of criteria which are either external (‘outside’ 
designations such as bank clerks, members of a trades union, etc.) or internal. These 
latter criteria refer to the notion of ‘group identification’, which is achieved when a 
person is aware both of being a member of the group (cognitive level) and of the 
value connotations which this membership implies (evaluative level). To these two 
components, Tajfel adds a third one, which he says is frequently associated with the 
previous two and which consists of an ‘emotional investment’ in the cognitive and 
evaluative levels (Tajfel, 1982: 2). Even though not explicitly theorized, geographers 
have often highlighted this emotional component in relation to people’s attachment to 
places, as for instance shown by the humanistic literature (Tuan, 1974; Relph, 1976; 
Frémont, 1976). Similarly, the notion of national identity, particularly when addressed 
from a primordialist perspective, is also frequently associated with an emotional 
dimension (Connor, 1994; Sheff, 1994; Smith, 1995). Likewise, the (lack of) 
emotions appears repeatedly in the scholarly debate about the European demos (i.e. a 
political community built around a shared identity), whose nonexistence is indeed 
attributed to the absence of collective emotional feelings towards Europe (Cederman, 
2001: 146 – see also Shore, 2004). 
The trends observed in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 seem to suggest that people might agree 
or disagree with what ‘Europe’ is, but it clearly does not stimulate the same level of 
emotional attachment as other forms of territorial attachment. Europe is not (yet?) 
there. The relatively unstable trend of European attachment across the years seems 
somehow to validate this point. Broadly speaking, if today people feel attached to 
Europe and tomorrow they do not, maybe Europe is not precisely an identity marker, 
at least from people’s perspective. Here the term ‘identity’ seems more appropriate 
than ‘identification’, which, following the seminal work of Stuart Hall (1996), is 
today largely used by scholars in order to avoid being trapped into a reifying or 
essentializing discourse (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Jenkins, 2004). Yet, in the 
focus groups and interviews which I conducted, people talked of identity as a thing or 
a property which they had (or did not have), i.e. as a persisting and stable quality – an 
attitude also observed by Gabel (1998: 109). Thus, in this article, I prefer the term 
‘identity’ rather than ‘identification’, as a way to better render the ontological 
character which respondents attributed to their identity. 
From the trends observed above, European attachment appears to be dependent on 
contingent events, whereas local, regional and national attachments are much more 
stable and impermeable to economic or political changes. As a way of investigating 
further why people feel or do not feel attached to Europe, i.e. as a way to explore 
meanings of Europe, I will analyze a set of qualitative data collected in four European 
regions in the next section. 
 
 
III. COLLECTING QUALITATIVE DATA ON EUROPEAN ATTACHMENT 
 
The qualitative information used to explore the meanings associated with 
European attachment was collected between May 2005 and January 2006 in four 
European regions: Lombardia (Italy), Pirkanmaa (Finland), North-East of England 
(United Kingdom), and Languedoc-Roussillon (France). The selection of these four 
regional case-studies was based on cross-tabulating the results of a cluster analysis 
(using the significant predictors from a binary logistic model on European attachment 
– Eb 60.1, 2003) and Eurostat data about regional GDP per capita (in Purchasing 
Power Parity values) for each region in the EU-15. In various statistical analyses 
which explain social behavior, income (both at an individual and regional level) often 
turns out to be a significant variable. On this basis I chose GDP per capita as a 
geographical factor in order to add contextual information to the personal 
compositional factors represented by the predictors of the model. The presence of the 
geographical contextual variable in the selection process aims to satisfy the traditional 
geographical concern about the importance of place (‘place matters’).  
The four selected regional case-studies offer a good representation of the different 
socio-economic, political, and geographical conditions of the EU-15. In socio-
economic terms, Lombardia is one of the richest regions in Europe and a major 
‘engine’ of the European economy (Le Galès and Lequesne, 1998), followed by 
Pirkanmaa, whose regional capital, Tampere, has long been on the forefront of the 
knowledge economy and information society (Castells and Himanen, 2002). Down 
the ladder, the North-East of England is a region still heavily affected by the closure 
of the coal mining sector, with a relatively high level of unemployment, high numbers 
of people living on benefits and low level of education (Colls and Lancaster, 1992). 
Similarly, Languedoc-Roussillon is one of the poorest regions of France, with an 
economy essentially based on services for the domestic market and therefore rather 
impermeable to the effects of global economic competition (Giband, 2005). In 
political terms, Lombardia is a region traditionally conservative, at the opposite of the 
North East of England, which has been for long time a stronghold of the Labour 
Party. A unique coalition of right and left parties (‘brothers in arms’) characterizes 
Tampere, while in the Languedoc-Roussillon the long-lasting tradition of the Midi 
Rouge (Genieys, 1998) has given way recently to more centrist and rightist (National 
Front) parties. Geographically, the four selected case-studies represent both the North 
and the South of Western Europe and reflect different attitudes towards the process of 
European integration, from the positive (Lombardia, Languedoc-Roussillon) to the 
less positive (Pirkanmaa) or overtly skeptical (North East of England).  
In each of these four regions, I conducted four focus groups, with 4-5 participants 
in each, males and females, aged 18-26 years old. The composition of the groups used 
education as a ‘control characteristic’ (Bedford and Burgess, 2001; Knodel, 1993). As 
such, in each region two groups were formed by participants with a university degree 
(or in the process of obtaining it) and two groups by participants without a university 
degree (and not willing to obtain it in the future). The first group of participants was 
recruited through advertising the research in the universities of the towns where I was 
based during my field work (Como, Italy; Tampere, Finland; Durham-Newcastle, 
Britain; Montpellier, France). The second group proved much more difficult to 
recruit, despite the small monetary incentive which was equally offered to every 
participant. In this case, a mix of different techniques (posting leaflets in public sites, 
randomly ‘popping-up’ in shops and restaurants, and, most effectively, contacting 
personnel and students of ‘professional’ or ‘vocational’ schools) eventually proved 
successful. 
Participants did not have any foreign background and each of them was a native of 
the selected regions. In some cases participants knew each other, which seemed to 
ease the discussion, particularly among the less educated participants. Overall, 
discussions ran smoothly, but it should be noted that in Finland focus groups were 
conducted by a Finnish colleague, who, despite being briefed about the techniques to 
use, intervened rather frequently, preventing in some instances a free flowing 
discussion. 
I also personally conducted about 100 semi-structured individual interviews with 
‘local elites’ - here defined as any person with a political, institutional or social role 
within the local society. The guideline questions of both focus groups and interviews 
invited the respondents to mention the 2-3 most important things that came to their 
minds when they thought of themselves in relation to the four scales of territorial 
attachment. This expedient has been used as a way to ease the conversation, which 
could instead have been hampered by a direct question “please tell me what means for 
you to feel attached to…”. 
Overall, 185 respondents (108 males, 77 females) took part in this study. On the 
whole, data quality can be considered good. The fact that the focus groups were 
formed by people with different socio-demographic characteristics (education, gender, 
political preference, income, rural/urban place of residence, etc.) allowed for a good 
variety of opinions. As expected, in the case of lower educated groups, the discussion 
was not as rich and detailed as in the higher educated ones, which is an indirect 
confirmation of the good composition of the groups in relation to the adopted ‘control 
characteristic’. This fact, however, can also be due to the younger age of the lower 
educated participants (median age 20) compared to the higher educated ones (median 
age 23). 
An obvious structural limitation of the focus group data is that they do not cover 
the regional population as a whole, but only its youngest members. This limitation, 
however, is partially counterbalanced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
the elite interviewees were adults ranging from 26 to 80 years old. In this case, the 
fact of interviewing people across the whole spectrum of the political parties 
represented in the region provided a good variety of opinions. The only two 
limitations here relate to the fact that in the North East of England, a stronghold of the 
Labour Party, only a few Conservative voices were heard, whereas in Finland, where 
interviews were conducted in English, few people affirmed at the end of the 
interviews that they did not manage to fully express their thoughts as they wished, due 
to the language barrier. 
Qualitative data were coded following an inductive approach, i.e. codes were not 
generated on the basis of an a priori theory, but on the observation of recurring 
patterns (Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Silverman, 2004; Weinberg, 2002). During this 
‘open coding’ process, frequencies were created and socio-demographic information 
about the respondents was also entered into the same spreadsheet. This helped to 
conceptually organize the materials. Data analysis, however, was not based on a mere 
‘enumerative’ approach (i.e. the counting of frequencies associated with each code), 
but on what Crang (1997: 188) calls ‘analytic induction’ – an approach which, 
echoing the grounded theory method, relies on the iterative process of going back and 
forth between original data and theoretical concepts in order to reach successively 
more abstract categorizations (see also Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). 
 
 
IV. MEANINGS OF EUROPE 
On the basis of the analytical approach discussed above, I have categorized the 
answers of the respondents into two broad categories: ‘cultural’ and ‘functional-
utilitarian’. In ‘cultural’ terms, Europe was defined through referents (e.g. history, 
traditions, values, etc.) which gave Europe itself a peculiar ‘identity of region’ (Paasi, 
1991). Cultural referents were further categorized into ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ 
referents – a distinction also used by Beck and Giddens (2006). ‘Cultural-national’ 
referents describe Europe by using the same vocabulary employed to define the 
nation-state and therefore equate Europe with a would-be nation-state. Alternatively, 
‘cultural-transnational’ referents depict Europe as a transnational project, idea or 
principle, often based on moral values and heralded as a ‘normative’ model (Manners, 
2002) for the rest of the world. In ‘functional-utilitarian’ terms, Europe is simply 
conceived as a space which could help the individual and/or the collectivity to which 
the individual belongs enhance their well-being and welfare. 
It should be noted that although the respondents’ attitudes towards Europe 
reflected in each region the national trend measured respectively by quantitative 
studies (e.g. English respondents appeared to be more Euro-skeptic than the Italians), 
this regional/national factor did not emerge so clearly in the ways respondents made 
sense of Europe. This means that national, transnational and utilitarian meanings 
emerged rather equally across the four regions. This is a relevant finding, as it 
suggests that, despite the positive or negative attitude that a person might have 
towards Europe, the ways s/he understands it (i.e. the meanings of Europe) do not 
seem to vary considerably from region to region. Instead, socio-demographic factors 
seemed to play a more important role, particularly in relation to the articulation of 
Europe in transnational terms. In this case, political preference and education emerged 
as important factors, as left-wing respondents were the most prone to talk of Europe 
in transnational terms and lower educated respondents more frequently used a 
‘national’ perspective to describe Europe, often in negative terms. 
Finally, it should be noted that although respondents were asked to comment on 
their attachment to ‘Europe’, an overwhelming majority of them understood this term 
to be a synonym of the European Union, which henceforth justifies the use of the term 
EUrope as a way of capturing this conceptual overlapping. 
 
Cultural Meanings: National 
The construction of EUrope in ‘cultural-national’ terms utilizes a repertoire of 
referents which clearly echoes the ones used to describe the nation-state. People, 
language, culture, history, traditions, religion, law, and political institutions were 
terms often used by respondents to define their (lack of) EUropean attachment. Yet, 
rather than talking of a commonality of these elements among EUropeans, 
respondents stressed the richness or the diversity of them. This was thought to make 
EUrope ‘special’, unique and shape its ‘identity of region’ (Paasi, 1991). “EUropean 
identity is about diversity – affirmed a French regional councilor (Socialist Party). It’s 
to acknowledge that we are all different. We are a multitude of states, with different 
traditions and cultures… each very respectable. We should preserve them [stressed], 
it’s about richness.” The fact that a commonality of cultural traits was acknowledged 
along with cultural and historical diversities should not be seen as a contradiction. 
Indeed, both focus group participants and elite interviewees perceived EUrope as a 
space where both commonality and diversity of values, cultures and history coexist. In 
other words, as also stressed by other authors (Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Mayer 
and Palmowski, 2004) and as the EU itself officially acknowledges, ‘commonality in 
diversity’ is what makes the ‘identity of EUrope’. 
In many cases, however, this richness of cultural elements was also said to 
constitute a major obstacle to the sentiment of EUropean attachment. This negative 
interpretation, even more than the positive one, clearly relies on a national 
perspective. Seen through the prism of the nation-state, EUrope was said to lack a 
common language, a common culture, and a common history and therefore, the 
respondents said, it could not trigger a sentiment of attachment or cultural belonging. 
The lack of a common language was the issue which mainly captured the attention 
of focus group participants in particular. As one English participant observed, “it’s 
pretty hard to be EUropean [with] all these different countries with different 
languages”. Linguistic diversity is a point widely investigated in the literature (see, 
for instance, Bellier, 2002 and Lowenthal, 2000), besides being a major issue in the 
formation of a public discourse conducive to a EUropean collective identity or demos 
(Zürn, 2000). However, the point put forward by the participants was not only related 
to the lack of a common medium of communication. English today can certainly play 
this role among many EUropean citizens. Yet, as affirmed by one Italian focus group 
participant, the ability to communicate in another language does not trigger the same 
sentiment of cultural belonging as it does when people can speak the same native 
language: 
 
“Language still remains something which differentiates, in terms of belonging, 
those who speak your language from those who don’t. Then, if a person is able to 
speak English and to communicate with others, it’s ok. However, your language… 
I mean there is a greater belonging with those who speak your language.” 
 
From this perspective, the nation as defined by those who speak the same 
language will always exercise a higher emotional attachment and sense of identity and 
belonging than a multi-national community. Together with linguistic differences, the 
lack of a common history was also mentioned to be a major obstacle to the sentiment 
of EUropean attachment: “If there is no history – affirmed a French focus group 
participant - there isn’t a cultural belonging. Europe’s history it’s just about 
economic treaties! It’s too abstract! For me, the important link is common history.” 
Similar comments were also heard among the elites: “Nobody has ever told me – 
remarked a Finnish representative of the Center Party - what does [sic] it mean to be 
European... some people say that [it is] because we are in the European Union, but I 
think that’s ridiculous: it’s only [a] political and economic system, [the] European 
Union, but it has nothing to do with identity, real identity, it comes from culture and 
history and those things which are common [in] between.” In these comments, issues 
of attachment, contained in the original question, combine with issues of belonging 
and identity, thus reflecting the blurriness, reproduced also in scholarly studies, which 
surrounds these concepts. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the last comment 
highlights the use of identity in an ontological sense (‘real identity’) – a trait common 
in other respondents and which justifies here the use of the term ‘identity’ rather than 
‘identification’.  
Narratives of EUrope based on a national perspective also led to the portrayal of 
EUrope as a threat to the pre-existing nation-states. This view clearly relies on a 
‘either/or’ logic: either the nation-state will remain or EUrope will take over, 
homogenizing all national differences (Zürn, 2000: 200). When conceived as a 
potential nation-state, EUrope generated anxiety among focus group participants - 
particularly among those less educated, who were also the ones who most feared that 
their particular identities would disappear, crushed under an all-encompassing 
European identity. Interestingly, the same ‘either/or’ logic was also echoed by those 
participants who were supportive of EUrope, as for instance put by an Italian 
respondent: “If we go back in time, I think that one’s region - Lombardy, Campania 
or Sicily - was important. Now this thing has faded away. A person feels more Italian 
than Sicilian [or] Calabrese and I think that for Europe it can be the same thing.” 
The model of the nation-state is used here to make sense of what EUrope will be. 
EUrope will become a sort of new nation-state, whereas the old nation-states will just 
transform into regions. Although the participant acknowledges the continuing 
existence of national identities, these are reduced to mere regional identities contained 
within a new national identity, namely EUropean. 
A similar anxiety was also present among the elite interviewees, but in this case it 
emerged mainly as a fear of losing national sovereignty and independence. The elite 
interviewees often voiced their concerns about a democratic deficit. Ironically, given 
the fact that most of the elite interviewees were politicians, these concerns were 
articulated in terms of a distance between ‘us’ (people) and ‘them’ (Euro-politicians 
or Euro-bureaucrats). In other cases, the interviewees mentioned the lack of trust 
among different EUropean nationalities (Finnish interviewees, for instance, were 
skeptical about the correct functioning of the politico-administrative system in 
Brussels) or EUrope’s great geographical size. This latter concern, mainly boosted by 
the 2004 EU enlargement, was articulated, once again, in terms of a national 
perspective: “people are worried about something which is so big – affirmed an 
English MP (Labour Party) - and they cannot identify with and so what they identify 
with again is the nation-state.” According to a couple of interviewees, the great size 
of EUrope evoked the image of an ‘artificial’ union of the past, i.e. the Soviet Union, 
and prompted the question about the viability of democracy in such a large area – a 
question also debated among scholars (Shore, 2004). 
Those respondents who expressed a negative or skeptical view in relation to their 
attachment to EUrope often affirmed that this positive attachment would instead 
characterize their children. As it emerged in the interviews with the elites, though, the 
irony of this position is revealed by the fact that when focus group participants (i.e. 
the virtual ‘children’ of the elite interviewees) were asked about their European 
attachment, they also frequently projected this attachment onto their children rather 
than seeing it as characterizing themselves. In other words, EUrope as a space of 
‘national’ identification and attachment is something that, for the majority of the 
respondents, exists more in reference to the future rather than here and now – an 
attitude which somehow resonates with the relatively low and unstable attachment 
trend seen in the Eurobarometer data. 
In all the quotes discussed above, respondents equated EUrope with a would-be 
nation-state. Obviously, this triggered sentiments of attachment (or non attachment), 
as EUrope was perceived to have (or not have) its own specific identity. In other 
words, the definition of EUrope in ‘cultural-national’ terms created the figure of a 
would-be national subject towards which the respondent felt like expressing (or not 
expressing, if s/he thought that the ‘cultural-national’ requisites were missing) some 
form of attachment. In this sense, attachment and identity (of EUrope) are mutually 
constituted, as that the former is triggered by the existence of the latter, which in turn 
is reinforced by the presence of attachment. Thus, the existence of EUrope both as an 
identity subject and a source of identity for the individual generates feelings of 
attachment, which in turn strengthen EUrope’s identity. 
Yet, it would be misleading to exclusively associate attachment to a notion of 
EUrope defined in ‘cultural-national’ terms alone, as respondents also expressed their 
attachment in connection with a transnational EUrope. Moreover, from a scholarly 
point of view, focusing on this perspective alone would generate involuntary 
normative effects, as it would constrain the complexity of EUrope as a social, political 
and economic space within the ontological grid of the nation-state. This is exactly the 
conceptual error that Agnew (1994) has labeled ‘territorial trap’ and that students of 
nationalism calls ‘methodological nationalism’ (Chernilo, 2006), as social scientists 
forget to consider that the nation-state is a historical product and should not be taken 
for granted as a fixed unit of territorial sovereignty and an exclusive container of 
society. 
 
 
Cultural Meanings: Transnational 
 
Along with culture, history, and traditions, common values were also mentioned 
by the respondents. EUrope was described as a space of democracy, tolerance, 
humanism, and protection of human rights. These values clearly have a cosmopolitan 
or transnational character (Rumford, 2003; Beck and Giddens, 2006). They can be a 
source of identification for many people, despite their national background. 
Theoretically, however, the distinction between ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ should 
be taken with caution. On the one hand, students of nationalism might indeed consider 
these universal values as an expression of civic nationalism, i.e. a form of national 
identity which relies on political rather than cultural values (Smith, 1995). This being 
the case, transnational narratives about EUrope would not constitute an analytical 
category per se, but they would reproduce the ‘national’ perspective seen above. On 
the other hand, the same students of nationalism might also underline that civicness is 
a ‘culture’ in itself, being the product of a specific people living in a specific region 
(Smith, 1995; Yack, 1996). In this sense, EUrope as a transnational space would not 
be truly… transnational, since these values would remain attached to a specific socio-
cultural space and, as such, they could potentially be perceived as ‘foreign’ by 
someone who does not belong to that space, whether defined in national terms or not. 
Although theoretically blurred, the distinction between ‘national’ and 
‘transnational’ is justified here on the basis of the different ways in which the 
respondents talked about EUrope. Respondents indeed referred to EUrope as both a 
would-be nation-state and as something else: a project or an idea beyond the nation-
state, filled with transnational, universal principles. Consequently, in this latter case 
EUrope assumes the contours of a post-national space, even though the separation 
between the cultural and the political is here not as clearly demarcated as in the 
narration of EUrope as a functional-utilitarian space (see below). 
The attachment to EUrope in transnational terms was expressed, especially by 
focus group participants, in form of a normative signifier rather than an actual socio-
geographical space. Some participants talked about EUrope as an antidote against 
nationalism and as a space which has the duty to help foreign countries trapped in 
poverty. In both cases, EUrope was said to stand for a moral guiding principle in the 
conduct of international affairs rather than a particular territory or institution. This 
normative or ‘metaphysical’ dimension of EUrope emerges rather clearly in the 
following account of a Finnish focus group participant: “The European countries are 
based on geography and Europe shouldn’t necessarily be a geographical region. 
Europe could be more like a unifying way of thinking than some certain geographical 
region.” From this perspective, EUrope is not a physical, bounded space, but an idea 
or a project which transcends the nation-state. It embodies the universality of 
principles against the particularism of the nation-state. From this transnational 
perspective, as the focus group participants explicitly affirmed, EUrope does no 
longer constitute a threat to the nation-state, since EUrope stands for something other 
than the nation-state. In this case, as Soysal (2002: 281) states, the transnational (the 
universality of principles embodied by EUrope) is read as integral to the structuring of 
the national. 
This transnational perspective emerged even more frequently among the elite 
interviewees, particularly among those with left-wing political views. In this case, the 
reference to the universal values symbolized by EUrope was used to stress EUrope’s 
exemplary role for the rest of the world. EUrope was heralded as both a sort of 
champion of human rights and a laboratory for a globalization alternative to the one 
promoted by neo-liberal policies. 
 
“[...] And then, I don’t know – observed an Italian local leader of the left-wing 
party PDS - also in relation to a global role of EUrope, I would like that it would 
prevail that EUrope which has been successful in the construction of a democratic 
culture, a culture of rights – obviously an imperfect one, with many limits – but, 
anyhow, I think that this culture of rights, of social justice has been successful, if 
we look at other parts of the world.” 
 
A similar opinion was also shared by another Italian interviewee, a high-level 
representative of the Chamber of Commerce in Como, Lombardia: 
 
“I think that in this context, EUrope has a special role in history, since it can 
work as a laboratory for other continents. For instance, China, the Chinese 
explosion of these past decades… but if in 20-30 years they keep going along the 
same path they will encounter all the problems of Western societies, maybe even 
multiplied [...]. EUrope as a laboratory for the resolution of these problems can 
be an extraordinary example for this world.” 
 
Those interviewees who shared a transnational perspective often pointed to the 
role of Europe in shaping a different globalization, one which could serve the needs of 
individuals rather than the interests of (global) capital. This position, although heard 
across all the four regional case-studies, largely characterized the individual 
interviews in France. In the words of a Green Party’s regional councilor, EUrope was 
defined as “a tool to make a different globalization, more human, more social, more 
peaceful, and aimed at solving conflicts without war.” Not surprisingly, given the 
results on the French referendum on the Treaty for a European Constitution (May, 
2005), in which the extreme wings of the political spectrum converged in a common 
rejection of the perceived hyper-liberalism of the EU’s agenda, the demand for a 
social EUrope was also voiced by politically far-right interviewees. In this case, 
however, the demand was not exactly for an alternative globalization, rather for a 
protectionism which could stop global competition: “Europe can be a rampart 
against globalization, whereas in reality, it has abolished all defenses which could 
exist – commented a representative of the National Front in Languedoc-Roussillon. It 
does not compete against large blocks like America, and also China, Japan, etc… It’s 
more globalist than the globalists and that’s why we don’t like this Europe.” 
In relation to EUrope as both a champion of human rights and a laboratory for an 
alternative globalization, the respondents explicitly referred to the United States as 
EUrope’s main antagonist. Contrary to those authors who suggest that the US is 
EUrope’s Other only in economic terms (Soysal, 2002: 274-5), the respondents – both 
focus group participants and elite interviewees – clearly incorporated a cultural 
dimension in their ‘othering’ narratives (a confirmation of this result also emerges in 
an earlier survey – see OPTEM, 2001). The identity of EUrope was constructed 
against the strangeness of the US in terms of cultural values and mentality, historical 
referents (e.g. the ‘ancient’ characters of EUropean cities and traditions versus the 
new, ‘modern’ American townscape), the politico-economic system (US laissez-faire 
versus EUropean social democracy), and conduct in foreign policy (US military 
interventions versus EUropean diplomacy). This last point was highly debated by 
respondents, certainly being prompted by the recent war waged by the US against 
Iraq. “I personally would love to see a strong EUrope as a political entity to be a 
counter-balance against America”, affirmed a local politician (Liberal-Democrat 
Party) in the North East of England. A similar comment was put forward by a French 
Euro MP (Socialist Party): 
 
“The US should not be the only police in the world. EUrope should take its 
responsibility. If we don’t want that tomorrow this planet explodes in a conflict 
between the Americans, the Chinese, the Indians or others - which is possible in 
10 or 15 years time - EUrope has to have a defense system and competencies.” 
 
This idea of EUrope as a counter-balance to the US and as a champion of human 
rights is today the major common ‘EUtopia’ (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002) among 
many left-wing intellectuals on both shores of the Atlantic (see Balibar, 2003). Yet, 
this discourse which implicitly heralds the superior moral and normative standpoint of 
EUrope in regard to the rest of the world (Therborn, 2002; see also Mikkeli, 1998) has 
been criticized from both the right and the left. From the right, Robert Kagan (2002) 
has pointed out that EUrope can live in a ‘post-historical’ Kantian world of perpetual 
peace because the US still lives in the historical Hobbesian world of brute force and 
protects EUrope militarily. From the left, critiques have been made in relation to the 
blindness of EUrope towards its colonial and imperialist past, its normative and 
disciplinizing approach in international relations (e.g. the case of Turkey’s EU 
membership), its hypocritical treatment of ethnic minorities (e.g. the Maghrebins in 
France), its protectionism in trade relations (EU agricultural subsidies), or its recently 
mounting anti-immigration policies. According, for instance, to Amin (2004), the risk 
of this ‘enlightened’ EUrope is to generate a ‘dangerous’ divide between a space of 
progress and superiority on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other hand. 
This type of EUrope would contain the seeds of a new moral, civilizational, if not 
even racial superiority (Alibhai-Brown, 1998; Lutz, 1997), reproducing an orientalist 
and supremacist ideology which already characterized Europe’s past (Shore, 1996: 
485 – see also Diez, 2005). 
Not conceived as competing with the nation-state, but as enhancing its civic 
dimension and turning this into an enlightening and civilizational mission, the 
transnational notion of EUrope also triggered a sense of attachment among some 
participants, which, however, was voiced less frequently than the attachment (or lack 
of attachment) manifested in relation to a ‘cultural-national’ EUrope. 
 
 
Functional-utilitarian meanings 
 
Besides a national and a transnational perspective, respondents mentioned 
referents which could be categorized as functional-utilitarian. From this perspective, 
EUrope appears to be functional to the individual well-being of the respondent or the 
society (often the nation) to which the respondent belongs. Individually, the benefits 
associated with EUrope mainly concerned mobility (e.g. ease of traveling, studying or 
living in another country) and the use of the same currency (Euro). Socially, the 
benefits were essentially said to be economic: EUrope can compete better on the 
global market than the nation-state can. 
As mentioned above, the utilitarian dimension has been suggested by Gabel 
(1998) as the main factor which statistically explains support for EUrope. Simply put, 
if an individual perceives to have a personal gain from the functioning of the EU, s/he 
will support it. Although in the present study the evidence is only qualitative, it is 
interesting to observe that respondents tied their pro-EUropean attitude not only to a 
personal utilitarian factor, but also to a social one. In other words, positive EUropean 
feelings were related to the perceived benefits that the society to which the respondent 
belonged could obtain from EUrope. Interestingly, a confirmation of both personal 
(e.g. “the ability to go wherever I want in Europe”) and social (e.g. “a means of 
improving the economic situation in Europe”) utilitarian dimensions clearly emerges 
from Eurobarometer surveys as well (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/subquestion_en.cfm).  
The elite interviewees, in particular, stressed the idea of EUrope as a functional 
space which can help the nation-state to remain an effective player in the global 
competition. EUrope, with its critical mass, was indeed said to be the only viable tool 
to compete successfully against other major world economies, especially the US and 
Asia (i.e. China). The coming together of the EUropean countries was therefore not 
justified, as seen above, on the basis of some cultural (national or transnational) 
dimension, but on utilitarian reasons – as a way to fight global economic competition. 
As a representative of the Confederation of Finnish Industries stated, “if we think that 
there is Asia, [and] the US, maybe there should be Europe as one”. Similarly, a 
Labour councilor from County Durham in the North East of England affirmed: “we 
are gonna be kicked off, if you like, if we are not strong… strong, in Europe, pan-
European… political and economic clout… we are gonna be kicked off. It’s a matter 
of need and anything else.” These narratives, which reproduce what Weiss (2002) has 
named ‘globalization rhetoric’ – a rhetoric which finds the rationale for the existence 
of EUrope somewhere outside EUrope itself - are not associated with any explicit 
cultural dimension. EUrope is not a cultural, but a functional-utilitarian space that 
helps people to defend their (national) welfares. 
Besides being seen as an answer to globalization, the social ‘utility’ of EUrope 
was also described by respondents with regards to specific national issues. For the 
Italian interviewees, EUrope could serve as a corrective to the mismanagement of the 
Italian state and as an incentive to ameliorate things in general – an attitude which can 
explain the high level of EUropean support among Italians (Kosic, 2003). For the 
English interviewees, EUrope played three major roles: a catalyst in the social and 
regional transformation of British society; a defender of British economic interests in 
the world; and, in the words of an anonymous civic officer, “a milk cow [that] we can 
use to bring more public money”. For the Finnish interviewees, EUrope had 
encouraged the ‘opening’ of the Finnish society to cultural diversity and helped 
Finland to distance itself from Russia, guaranteeing that Finnish identity is not 
confused with an ‘Eastern’, i.e. ‘non-EUropean’ dimension (see also Arter, 1995; 
Tiilikainen, 1997; Moisio, 2008). Finally, for the French interviewees, EUrope, 
besides offering an economic advantage, particularly in terms of protecting French 
farmers against global competition, also offered the possibility of keeping alive the 
memory of France’s past grandeur, as clearly stated by a local leader of the Radical 
Party ‘valoisien’: “Three centuries ago, France was still a great global country... so if 
we want to spread our philosophical values worldwide, France should find a bigger 
agglomerate and that agglomerate is EUrope.” 
In personal utilitarian terms, many respondents mentioned freedom of travel as the 
major advantage of EUrope. Interestingly enough, focus group participants 
spontaneously discussed whether traveling and being exposed to other EUropean 
cultures would trigger a sentiment of EUropean attachment. The majority of them 
thought that travel per se does not bring about this sentiment. Becoming acquainted 
with other EUropean people and places was not generally perceived as a factor which 
could trigger a sentiment of EUropean ‘we’ feeling. This seems to depend on the 
personal character of the respondent and her/his sense of ‘openness’ rather than on the 
act of traveling and getting to know people and places per se (on this point, see also 
Etzioni, 2007: 35). 
More relevant to the purpose of this study, however, is the fact that both focus 
group participants and elite interviewees acknowledged the absence of any significant 
emotional attachment and sense of identification associated with a EUrope narrated as 
a functional-utilitarian space. This point can best be captured by the following 
account of an English focus group participant: 
 
“Europe to me is… it’s a bit like the GB, UK thing to me, they’re kind of… not 
so much to do with culture and identity, they’re political things, they’re to do with 
money and economy and managing people and Europe has recently just 
incorporated a whole lot of new countries […]. I don’t actually feel European, I 
just want to reap the benefits from being a European citizen […]. With modern, 
like, Western, capitalist kind of society and culture I think that kind of umbrella 
hierarchy, structure is basically necessary to govern and manage those aspects of 
life but then I want to keep, because that’s all very personal, I want to keep 
cultural identity close to me, have it personal, have it meaningful.” 
 
EUrope is seen as a space which protects the rights of the individual and enhances 
his/her well-being. It is a necessary political and economic overarching dimension in 
the ‘modern’ age, i.e. in the age of globalization. Yet, it triggers neither a sentiment of 
emotional attachment, nor a sense of identity. This distinction between function and 
attachment/identity echoes the reflection initiated by Habermas (2001) on the 
distinction between a ‘political’ and a ‘cultural’ sphere. In contrast to the nation-state, 
where the ‘political’ (the functions of the state) and the ‘cultural’ (the sentiment of 
collective identity) have traditionally coincided, in the case of EUrope there seems to 
be a separation between the two – a feature which has been said to characterize the 
post-national era (Hedetoft and Hjort, 2000: xvi; Zürn, 2000: 188). Respondents, in 
fact, accept that EUrope carries out certain political, social and economic functions, 
but they keep their collective identity firmly attached to a narrower geographical scale 
(national, regional or local): 
 
“I am a bit EUropean – affirmed a representative of the Finnish trade union 
SAK.  
M.A.: Oh, you feel European 
I am a bit… but we don’t need any European identity… I am Finnish in 
Europe. Many of my colleagues they are from Belgium and Netherlands… they 
are… they say: ‘we need EUropean, we need to be European’, but I am a bit 
[skeptical] we are Finnish in the European Union, that’s it. 
M.A.: What does it mean that ‘bit’ – a bit European? 
As I said, I can see some ‘positivities’ for European solutions 
M.A.: So this is why you consider yourself European 
That’s right 
M.A.: It is not culturally… 
No... 
M.A.: Culturally you are Finns… 
Yes. We don’t need any so called EUropean identity… in cultural meaning… 
we don’t need 
 
The above interviewee sees, in rational, utilitarian terms, the positive aspects of 
EUrope as a politico-economic space and accepts defining himself as a member of 
this space. This belonging, though, is expressed in political rather than cultural terms. 
There is no clear sense of attachment here, as this functional EUrope is not seen as a 
source of identity. It is exactly this lack of identity, of emotional dimension associated 
with the notion of EUrope as a functional space, which was lamented by those 
respondents who privileged a ‘national’ perspective:  
 
 “[Identity] is necessary - observed a leader of the French far right-wing party 
National Front - because we are made of flesh and blood and it is necessary that 
together with advantages, however illusive... the heart has to function at the same 
time with the mind.” 
 
Similar considerations were also made by another populist right-wing political 
representative, in the North East of England:  
 “If people were computers I would then go for the European Union and get rid 
of the nation-states, but people are nationalistic, we are not computers, we are 
emotional things that make decisions based on… […] people are not logical, we 
are animals, and instincts that drive in certain directions.” 
 
This ‘national’ perspective rejects the idea that EUropean belonging can only be 
based on personal or social utilitarian interests, as it needs some deep cultural 
elements, which in turn elicit those instinctual, primordial passions which only can 
cement a community as… a ‘national’ community. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Among the various forms of territorial attachment which have been periodically 
surveyed by Eurobarometer, European attachment shows the highest variation across 
time and the least emotional involvement. As a way of capturing the meanings 
associated with this particular form of territorial attachment, a qualitative analysis, 
conducted in four regional case-studies, has allowed me to understand EUropean 
attachment in relation to three different notions of EUrope: cultural-national, cultural-
transnational, and functional-utilitarian (see Fig. 3). It is important to note that the 
three ways of narrating EUrope do not exist as separated categories, but as narratives 
which the same respondent can activate under different circumstances. This opens up 
space for a further study on the ways in which these narratives can be connected 
among them and on the circumstances which privilege the activation of one narrative 
over the others. 
_______________________________ 
 
INSERT FIG. 3 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
‘Cultural-national’ referents narrate EUrope through the same vocabulary used to 
understand the nation-state and reproduce the same isomorphism between the political 
(territory) and the cultural (identity) which has traditionally characterized, at least in 
theory, the nation-state (Appadurai, 1996; Hedetoft and Hjort, 2000). Not 
surprisingly, therefore, many respondents who adopted this perspective claimed to 
have a negative attachment to EUrope. EUrope, indeed, as also suggested by scholars 
who implicitly champion this national perspective (Mann, 1998; Smith, 1995), lacks a 
common language, a common ethnie, and common myths. In a few other cases, 
however, this same perspective was adopted by respondents to describe their positive 
attachment to EUrope. Here, either respondents acknowledged the commonality of 
some cultural referents (e.g., history, traditions, religion, etc.) or they maintained that 
the uniqueness of the EUropean culture was based on a multitude of national and 
regional cultures: ‘unity in diversity’. 
‘Cultural-transnational’ referents depict EUrope as a universal project, idea, or 
principle, presented as a normative model for the rest of the world: a model for 
‘another’ globalization, more social and less driven by economic neo-liberalism, and a 
champion of humanitarianism and international peace around the world (see also 
Bruter, 2004 for similar findings). What is important is that, whether narrated in 
‘national’ or ‘transnational’ terms, EUrope acquires an ‘identity of region’ (Paasi, 
1991), which potentially triggers a sentiment of attachment and identification among 
people. This seems to confirm that the notion of attachment is closely related to one of 
identity, in the sense that any socio-cultural space perceived as a source of identity 
also generates a form of attachment, i.e. an emotional feeling, which can therefore be 
used as a proxy for detecting a sense of identity. In this sense, attachment, identity, 
and emotion are closely interconnected and seem to mutually reinforce each other. 
A different interpretation applies to the narration of EUrope in ‘functional-
utilitarian’ terms. In this case, EUrope is simply conceived as a space which could 
help both the individual (‘personal’) and the collectivity to which the individual 
belongs (‘social’) to enhance their welfare. When narrated in these terms, EUrope no 
longer matters as a subject endowed with certain ‘national’ features or ‘transnational’ 
values, i.e. with certain cultural traits, but as a politico-economic institution that can 
deliver economic and social welfare. This EUrope hardly triggers any sort of 
attachment or identity. The absence of cultural elements which can transform EUrope 
into a source of identity for the individual explains the absence of attachment, i.e. of 
emotional commitment. On the contrary, what seems to exist is a sentiment of 
political belonging, which, from the answers of the respondents, can be defined as the 
rational commitment of a person to belong to a politico-economic space irrespectively 
of a sentiment of identification with and attachment to this space. This form of 
belonging was motivated by the respondents with a rational appraisal of their 
individual and/or collective interests.  
This finding does not negate the structural link between politics, identity, and 
interests put forward, for instance, by Ringmar (1996 – quoted in Moisio, 2008). In 
fact, people’s attitudes towards the EU can certainly be motivated by an emotional 
need to defend their identity. Yet, in the case of EUrope, the identity at stake is not 
EUropean, but national. It is as a Finn, not as a EUropean that the respondent declares 
his/her belonging to EUrope, since this latter is perceived as beneficial to his/her 
interest, i.e. to the interest of reproducing his/her being Finnish. 
The existence of political belonging in the absence of a sentiment of common 
identity means that EUrope today can also be described as a post-national space, one 
which overcomes the ideological isomorphism between the cultural and the political 
on which the nation-state has legitimized its existence (Shore, 2004: 29; Zürn, 
2000:188). In this regard, the major point of debate is whether a politico-institutional 
space which is not associated with a demos can support a sound and stable democracy 
(Cederman, 2001). It can be true that, as some supporters of the post-national idea 
maintain, this identity will be generated ex-post, through the mere functioning of the 
EUropean institutions (Kohli, 2000). Some scholars also suggest that a sense of 
collective identity can simply be generated from the efficient functioning of a political 
system (Kritzinger, 2005). Yet, in both cases, EUrope would then transform back 
from a post-national into a national space, either civic or ethnic. Other post-national 
authors, however, do not consider as relevant at all the existence of a sense of 
collective identity to support a democracy and its redistributive policies (Føllesdal, 
2000 – see also Kaelberer, 2004). 
On the basis of the accounts of the respondents in this study, what can be 
pragmatically concluded is that when analyzed through the perspective of attachment, 
EUrope emerges as the product of a plurality of voices. Therefore, if the question is 
about popular support for EUrope, it would be misleading to espouse exclusively a 
‘national’ approach, which maintains that in the absence of a collective sense of 
identity, there is neither room nor legitimacy for a stable and democratic polity. 
Empirical evidence in this article suggests that positive attitudes towards EUrope can 
also be generated by reasons other than emotional attachment or identification. This 
point seems in line with the most recent attempts to capture the nature of EUrope 
following a post-Westphalian discourse (Zielonka, 2006). From this perspective, as 
EUrope would not be governed by a single political institution similarly it would also 
not be characterized by a single pan-European identity. Its legitimacy would 
consequently not be based on feelings of affection and trust which would spring out of 
a common identity, but on a plurality of sources spanning from multiple (national) 
identities to new forms of political participations, representations and accountability 
(Ibid: 182). However limited in scope, the empirical evidence discussed in this article 
seems to confirm this argument. 
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